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THE PROMISE OF THE FUTURE - AND 
VICE VERSA: SOME REFLECTIONS ON 
THE METAMORPHOSIS OF 
CONTRACT LAWt 
Charles L. Knapp* 
CONTRACTS. By E. Allan Farnsworth. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co. 1982. Pp. xxiii, 984. $25. 
With the publication of his new treatise on Contract Law, Profes-
sor E. Allan Farnsworth secures his claim to be regarded as the 
Clark Kent Scholar of modem Contract Law. By day a distin-
guished Professor of Law at one of our greatest university law 
schools,1 by night mild-mannered Reporter (since 1971) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts, Professor Farnsworth has now 
come forth in yet a third capacity, with a comprehensive treatise on 
the whole of Contract Law - a work which for most ordinary 
mortals would by itself be sufficient achievement for a lifetime. 
Thoughtfully organized and lucidly written, its nearly one thousand 
pages roam over the whole range of topics currently comprehended 
under the rubric of Contract Law, including many which ordinarily 
get short shrift from casebook authors and teachers of the first-year 
Contracts course.2 While, in fairness to other authors of similar 
works,3 it cannot precisely be said that Famsworth's new treatise fills 
what was hitherto a void, it does appear that in terms of ability, 
background and motivation he is perhaps uniquely qualified to pro-
duce a work of this sort at this time.4 It seems safe to predict that 
t Copyright © 1984, Charles L. Knapp. 
* Professor of Law, New York University. B.A. 1956, Denison University; J.D. 1960, New 
York University. Author, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW (1976). - Ed. 
1. In addition to teaching law at Columbia University Law School, Professor Farnsworth 
has been author or coauthor of several casebooks, including E. FARNSWORTH & W. YouNo, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1980). 
2. E.g., capacity, pp. 213-32; fraud and duress, pp. 232-71. His discussion of "substance, 
status, and behavior," pp. 212-71, is particularly helpful. 
3. Most notably Professors John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, authors of THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1977) and Dean John E. Murray, Jr., author of MURRAY ON CON-
TRACTS (2d rev. ed. 1974). 
4. Farnsworth's perspective as Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
(1979) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT 2D] enables him to combine his discussion of case 
law with a survey of the rules and co=entary of the Restatement. Sometimes he defends the 
Restatement position, as in his discussion of RESTATEMENT 2D § 351(3), which proposes a 
limitation on liability for even foreseeable loss where disproportionate compensation would 
result. Pp. 893-94. At other times he appears to be skeptical of its approach, as in his discus-
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this book will become a standard - perhaps the standard - work of 
its kind, widely consulted, cited, and quoted by anyone concerned 
with the issues it discusses. 
In light of the influence this work is likely to wield, it seems fair 
to consider not merely what Farnsworth has set out to do, and how 
well he has done it, but also what he has left undone. One can then 
ponder what implications the answers to these questions (particu-
larly the last one) may have for the rest of us who study, practice, 
teach, or write about Contract Law. 
I 
In his preface (p. xix), Farnsworth declares as his goal the writing 
of a book that would be useful both to law students taking the course 
in Contracts and to lawyers seeking a general treatment of some 
topic in that area. Not surprisingly, in light of his long experience as 
a teacher and casebook author, he has on the first score succeeded 
admirably. His textual expositions of the common law rule structure 
are always carefully and logically set out, and eminently readable; 
they will be particularly helpful to students who find that after study 
of the assigned materials and attention to the class discussion they 
are still unable to construct a recognizable picture from the jigsaw-
puzzle pieces spread before them. 5 His exposition of doctrine is lib-
erally studded with discussions of particular court decisions, with at-
tention to both their holdings and their facts. 6 And the book begins 
sion of the commentary to § 86, calling for enforcement of some promises based on moral 
obligation. P. 59 n.36. Sometimes he is simply Delphic: A provision analogous to U.C.C. § 1-
107 "has found its way into the Restatement Second." P. 293. 
5. His discussions of assignment and delegation ( chapter 11 ), conditions and breach ( chap-
ter 8) and the parol evidence rule, pp. 447-77, are especially helpful. However, by characteriz-
ing the parol evidence rule as applicable only to "prior negotiations," pp. 448, 451 (but see p. 
460), Farnsworth omits examination of one of the most common parol evidence rule problems: 
the oral agreement (frequently between a consumer and a merchant or merchant's agent) made 
at the same time that a standardized form (apparently integrated, and probably with a strong 
merger clause) is signed. 
6. As one would expect, his choices of which cases to single out for discussion in the text 
are sometimes arguable. Farnsworth's discussion of Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N.Y. 86, 161 
N.E. 428 (1928), p. 133, for instance, seems unnecessary and dubious, particularly since there is 
no cross-reference to his later suggestion, p. 187 n.15, that a case like Petterson might now be 
decided along the lines of Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409,333 P.2d 757 (1958). On 
the other hand, there might well have been textual discussion of Mineral Park Land Co. v. 
Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916) (briefly µientioned at p. 680 n.17), which seems a 
perfect example of a case whose facts are particularly conducive to a law-expanding decision. 
Sometimes Farnsworth seems to trot cases around the ring out of a somewhat weary sense that 
their appearance is expected: Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876), is introduced as "an 
English case that has achieved a notoriety somewhat exceeding its practical importance." P. 
150. Occasionally, he furnishes illuminating background on well-known cases, such as his 
revelation, p. 56 n.27, that defendant McGowin was in fact president of the company that 
employed plaintiff Webb in the famous falling-block case, Webb v. McGowin, 27 Ala. App. 
82, 168 So. 196 (1935); students often assume something of the sort but the fact does not appear 
in the report of the case. 
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with a brief summary of the historical antecedents of modem Con-
tract Law as well as its current sources (pp. 10-35) - particularly the 
Restatements and the Uniform Commercial Code - which is help-
ful material often supplied only interstitially, if at all, by casebook 
authors and classroom teachers. 
In format, the book is well constructed for student reference. It 
has a useful topical index, which includes some innovative features, 7 
and unobtrusive topic headings in the margins throughout the text 
help a scanning reader to find the precise area of coverage sought. 8 
The only readily apparent shortcoming is the absence of any section-
number index for either the Uniform Commercial Code or the Re-
statement of Contracts; entries listed by topic under these headings in 
the main index are helpful, but sometimes they do not enable the 
reader to locate discussion of the particular Code or Restatement 
provision under study. In general, however, the book seems to fill 
the bill for any student seeking in-depth supplementary reading for 
the conventional course in Contracts. 
For practitioners, the utility of the book is perhaps less obvious. 
As many (including Farnsworth himself (p. 30)) have noted, ques-
tions of law involving enforcement of contracts today tend to be an-
swered by more specialized bodies of rules, such as "labor law," 
"securities law," "insurance law," etc. But for the attorney seeking a 
refresher or an update on the basic notions of Contract Law, Farns-
worth provides an excellent summary, concise enough to be manage-
able but deep enough to be useful. His footnote citations of cases are 
regularly accompanied by parenthetical capsule descriptions, calcu-
lated to save time that might be wasted going up blind alleys. His 
marshalling of the case authorities into intelligible patterns should 
also give the researcher considerable aid in trimming the thicket of 
case law into, if not a topiary garden, at least a maze with both an 
entrance and an exit. 
Farnsworth treats one specialized area oflaw, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (particularly Article 2), in considerable detail because 
of its powerful impact on general Contract Law, both in individual 
cases not involving the sale of goods and in the abstracted rules 
which make up the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Not designed 
to be a treatise on the Code itself, Famsworth's book does not aspire 
to the depth or detail of UCC coverage that other commentaries dis-
7. These include a ''words and phrases" index heading, p. 984 (indicating where to look for 
the meaning of such terms as "plain meaning"), and an index of "[c]ases, real and hypotheti-
cal" by such popular names as "hairy hand case" and ''tramp hypothetical," pp. 965-66. 
8. Somewhat less successful are the tacked-on transition sentences at the end of each sec-
tion of text, which are apparently supposed to ease the reader gently into the next section. 
Although intended, perhaps, to emulate the flow of a well-organized lecture, in print the gen-
eral effect produced is of text sections marching by like so many elephants on parade, each 
with its trunk hooked onto the tiny tail of its predecessor. 
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play,9 but it is particularly helpful in suggesting ways in which attor-
neys and judges can approach areas where the Code and the 
common law intersect.10 Only occasionally does he appear to fal-
ter11 or to stop short where he might well have pressed on.12 For the 
most part, these brief glosses on the Code - dealing as they often do 
with questions on which little or no case authority exists - should 
themselves serve as authority for attorneys or judges seeking gui-
dance on these issues. 
In terms of the goals he has set for himself, Farnsworth has 
scored a stunning success with this book. Both law students and, to a 
somewhat lesser degree, practicing attorneys should find it useful. 
There are, however, other potential constituencies for the book - in 
9. E.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1980). 
10. Thus, Farnsworth points out that whether contracts involving a mix of goods and ser-
vices should be governed by Article 2 need not be an all-or-nothing proposition, but depends 
on the issue at stake - the U.C.C. Statute of Frauds (§ 2-201) can be applied restrictively, 
even though the cases extending the implied warranties have taken an expansive position. P. 
405. Despite some adverse decisions, he sees no reason why the drafters of Article 2 would 
have intended in U.C.C. § 2-201(1) to change the prevailing rule that a signed written offer can 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds as against the offeror, even though it does not by itself evidence a 
"contract." P. 407 n.16. He supplies case authority for the proposition that evidence of fraud 
should not be excluded by the Code's parol evidence rule (§ 2-202), even though not specifi-
cally mentioned therein, p. 465 (presumably, U.C.C. § 1-103 would also support this result). 
He notes that the concept of "course of performance," U.C.C. § 2-208, should have general 
application, despite its omission from U.C.C. § 1- 205, which defines "course of dealing" and 
''usage of trade." P. 514. He also suggests that courts applying U.C.C. § 2-609 may be inclined 
to follow REsTATEMENT 2D § 251 in dispensing with the requirement that a notice requesting 
"adequate assurance of due performance" be in writing. P. 645 n.23. 
11. Farnsworth analyzes U.C.C. § 2-306(2) ("Output, Requirements and Exclusive Deal-
ings") as having the "curious" effect of imposing a duty of ''best efforts" on both buyer and 
seller under an agreement for exclusive dealing, even though an output contract imposes, he 
asserts, a duty of only "good faith" (i.e., less than best efforts) on the seller, but an "absolute" 
duty (I.e., more than best efforts) on the buyer. P. 530 n.19. I have always assumed that§ 2-
306(2) was simply afflicted with the same malaise of over-inclusive drafting as § 2-207, which 
lumps "confirmations" together with "acceptances," with confusing results. I would read § 2-
306(2) as stating two separate rules, one applying to output contracts and one to requirements 
contracts. Thus, to take the first example, "A lawful agreement •.. by the buyer [under an 
output contract] for exclusive dealing in the kind of goods concerned (i.e., an agreement that 
the buyer will buy such goods from no one else] imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation 
by [sic: on?] the [output] seller to use best efforts [instead of mere "good faith," as in 2-306(1)] 
to supply the goods, . . ." The same process reversed produces a mirror-image rule for impos-
ing a best efforts obligation on the requirements buyer in a case where the seller has bound 
itself to sell only to that particular buyer. · 
12. Discussing U.C.C. § 2-205, Farnsworth points out that there is no obstacle to protect-
ing a goods offeree under REsTATEMENT 2D § 87(2) from the surprise retraction of a "firm" 
offer, even if that offer could have been made in a fashion that satisfied§ 2-205, but wasn't. P. 
186 n.12. I have elsewhere suggested that an offeree of a goods contract should also be able to 
claim the protection of REsTATEMENT 2D § 87(2) in cases involving a firm offer to which 
U.C.C. § 2-205 in fact would apply (i.e., made in a signed writing by a merchant), even though 
the three-month time limit imposed by§ 2-205 had expired, provided the facts made it reason-
able for the offeree to rely substantially on the offer while at the same time delaying acceptance 
until that late a time. See Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Prol!feration of 
Promissory Estoppel, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 52, 65-67 (1981). Such a case is hypothetically put in 
C. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 278-79 (1976). 
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particular, teachers of Contract Law. What will Famsworth's trea-
tise say to them? Each ofus will probably have a different answer to 
that question; mine is set out in the discussion that follows. 
II 
Like all of my colleagues in the law teaching world, I have been 
wrestling since my first day in the classroom with the question of just 
what the responsibilites of a law teacher are (besides, of course, 
teaching our students to "think like lawyers" - while at the same 
time, one hopes, reminding them to think like people). My present 
tentative conclusion is that we have at least three responsibilities to 
our students: to set forth, as lucidly as we can, what we honestly 
believe to be the present state of "the law"; to make, as accurately as 
we can, our best guess as to what, during the careers of our students, 
"the law" is likely to become; to disclose, as diffidently but frankly as 
we can, our opinions as to what "the law" should be.13 To the extent 
that our opinions as to what the law should be may (either through 
our writings or through the influence of our former students) have 
some slight effect on what "the law" in fact does become, the second 
and the third functions described above are interrelated. The line 
between "I predict ... " and "I advocate ... " should always be 
made clear and visible, however, even if the object of each of those 
two verbs should on a given point tum out, for us, to be the same. 
As a text-writer, Farnsworth is - albeit in a different medium -
continuing to serve in his role as a law teacher. As such, he is free 
(and possibly obligated) to fulfill all three responsibilities of a teach-
ing scholar. As to the first, I have already indicated my admiration 
for his book's substantial achievement in describing the present state 
of Contract Law. To what extent does he also attempt either to pre-
dict what the law will become, or to advocate what it ought to be? 
As he proceeds from topic to topic, Farnsworth does not shy 
away from indicating the patterns of change he discerns in the accu-
mulated court decisions. I spotted at least the following identified 
"trends," and I doubt this list is exhaustive: increased enforcement of 
promises made in recognition of a moral obligation (p. 59); increased 
protection for pre-acceptance reliance (p. 192); increased readiness 
to compensate reliance on an agreement which for other purposes 
might be deemed too indefinite to enforce (pp. 209-10); increased 
willingness to protect those (particularly consumers) who sign agree-
13. On the third point, that of stating our own views, I am sure some of my colleagues will 
disagree, either because the "Socratic" tradition may appear to preclude it (although in its 
purest form that tradition probably precludes also the first two of my suggestions, leaving us 
with only "thinking like a lawyer'' as our subject for co=unication) or because there is a 
danger that students will view any expression of our views not as an invitation to discussion 
but as a directive for acquiescence. I agree that the latter is a danger, particularly in the first 
year of law school. 
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ments without reading them (p. 248); expansion of the grounds on 
which excuse will be granted for "duress" (pp. 262, 271 ); a narrowed 
application or even abolition of the "pre-existing duty" corollary of 
the consideration requirement (pp. 274-75); development of new 
techniques to relieve against "contracts of adhesion" (p. 296); ero-
sion of the Statute of Frauds (p. 373); a narrowed application of the 
Parol Evidence Rule (pp. 452-53); less insistence on strict compliance 
with express conditions (p. 565); expanded relief in cases of unilat-
eral mistake (p. 663); increased readiness to excuse performance be-
cause of extraordinary events (p. 683); greater availability of specific 
relief (p. 823); more frequent awarding of consequential damages 
where the harm complained of was or should have been reasonably 
foreseeable (as opposed to any requirement of a "tacit agreement" to 
that effect) (p. 876); less insistence that damages be shown with cer-
tainty (pp. 881, 887); increased sensitivity to the willful character of 
the breacher's conduct (p. 882); and greater willingness to enforce 
liquidated damages clauses (pp. 898, 901). 
Having identified all these trends in the law, however, Farns-
worth nowhere attempts to pull them together into a larger pattern, 
or to sketch some overall picture of what, in his judgment, Contract 
Law is in the process of becoming. Perhaps, as a good Socratic 
teacher, he thinks it appropriate to leave this task to his readers. If 
so, what should a dutiful if timid Socratic pupil venture in response? 
First, one has to concede that not all of these various trends ap-
pear on their face to be consistent with each other. In some respects, 
the area of liability is expanded, while in others it is reduced; in 
some ways, the law is readier to enforce the agreement which the 
parties themselves have made, while in others it is quicker to modify 
or even nullify that agreement in light of the court's view as to what 
their bargain ought to have been. These tensions are reconcilable, 
however, if some basic distinctions are first noted. One is the distinc-
tion between parties who have apparently dealt with each other on a 
footing of substantial equality-in-fact (such as two merchants not 
grossly disparate in bargaining skill, technical expertise or economic 
power) and parties who have dealt from positions of relative ine-
quality-in-fact (such as a consumer - perhaps poor, unsophisticated 
or at least uninformed about the subject matter of the transaction -. 
dealing with a merchant of at least ordinary competence). More 
strongly in the latter case than in the former, the overall trend clearly 
appears to be away from enforcement of the "bargain-in-form" (the 
standardized written form-contract) and toward (a) enforcement of 
any agreement actually made, even if "informal," as well as (b) relief 
from any grossly "unfair" terms of the bargain-in-form, even if those 
terms were not in fact varied by informal agreement between the 
parties. 
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A second distinction to be observed is between the question of 
whether a contractual obligation has been created and the question 
of whether a contractual duty has been discharged or excused. On 
the former question, that of threshold liability, the trend is clearly 
toward greater readiness to impose liability, as witnessed by the 
weakening of the formal rules of off er and acceptance (in favor of 
giving effect to "intention to be bound"), the protection of foresee-
able and reasonable pre-acceptance reliance, the atrophy of the Stat-
ute of Frauds, the willingness to enforce gratuitous and/or non-
commercial promises if foreseeably relied on, and the increased dis-
position to find a basis for enforcing promises actuated by feelings of 
"moral obligation" or made in recognition of "past consideration." 
If quicker to impose liability than in the past, however, the law has 
also become quicker to excuse it, by expanding existing grounds for 
excuse ( duress, impossibility, fraud) or by creating new ones (im-
practicability, unconscionability, promisee's failure to act in good 
faith). 
If one simply assumes that the various trends identified by Farns-
worth will continue, unchecked by countertrends, and that the larger 
generalizations ventured above accurately describe the overall pat-
tern to which those trends conform, then one could from these prem-
ises attempt to extrapolate a vision of what Contract Law might look 
like at some future date - say, the year 2000. Assuming that the 
felt need for Restatements of Law will also continue to that time 
( certainly that is a trend which presently shows no sign of subsiding), 
one could even attempt to encapsulate the central tenet of such a 
system in a typical Restatement provision, complete with the usual 
clutch of supporting comments (which would, of course, only hint at 
the wealth of detail awaiting the reader in other portions of that Re-
statement). In doing so, one might come up with something like the 
following: 
§ 1. PROMISES ENFORCEABLE 
Every promise made apparently with serious intention to perform is en-
forceable by any person foreseeably injured by its unjustified 
nonperformance. 
Comment: 
a. Types of promises covered There is no limitation as to subject 
matter on the types of promises covered by this principle. Promises 
in a business setting will often take the form of "offers" to engage in 
a present or future exchange of performances, or "acceptances" of 
such offers, but they may also include promises made not as part of 
any present or projected exchange. They may be made between per-
sons engaged in commercial transactions, between family members, 
or even between strangers (although the likelihood of enforcement in 
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the last case will be strongly affected by other factors, such as appar-
ent seriousness of intent and foreseeability of injury). Expressions of 
commitment are also frequently conditioned, either expressly or (in 
light of all the circumstances) impliedly, on the happening of other 
events; see the discussion in Comment j, below. 
b. Voluntariness. The term "promise" as used herein refers only 
to voluntary manifestations of commitment. Promises which are 
procured by improper coercion are not enforceable hereunder. "Im-
proper coercion" includes physical force; it also includes various 
types of "duress" not involving such force. (As to promises made as 
a result of fraudulent or material misrepresentations, see Comment/, 
below.) 
c. Form. If a promise would otherwise be enforceable under this 
principle, it is not unenforceable because it was made only orally, or 
informally, although in the absence of a signed_ writing evidencing 
the promise or in other cases where for any reason there is substan-
tial doubt whether the promise was actually made, the court may in 
the interest of avoiding possible injustice limit the remedy to com-
pensation of plaintiffs reliance. It is sometimes asserted that a 
promise has been made in a case where a written agreement between 
the promisor and promisee appears to negate, or to be inconsistent 
with, the asserted promise; in such a case this factor may be taken 
into account in deciding whether the asserted promise was in fact 
made. 
d. Intention to Peiform. The principle stated above applies only 
to promises which appear to have been seriously made, creating in 
the promisee a reasonable expectation of performance. In cases 
where there is neither a business relation (present or prospective) nor 
ties of affection between promisor and promisee, there may be little 
or no reason for the promisee to infer a serious intent to perform on 
the promisor's part. 
e. Standardized Forms. In cases where one person has expressed 
apparent commitment to one or more promises in a form prepared 
or supplied by the other, it is a question of fact whether the supplier 
of the form could have reasonably understood the other's assent to 
that form to manifest commitment to the promises contained therein. 
The degree of relative sophistication of the parties (particularly if the 
"promisee" is a merchant and the "promisor" is not) are relevant to 
this issue, as is the degree to which the promises contained in the 
form appear to reflect a bargain unconscionably favorable to the 
supplier of the form. 
f. Enforceability. In many cases, a decree of specific performance 
will be available, particularly where it appears that (because of the 
difficulty of calculating damages or for other reasons) injustice 
would otherwise result. In other cases, the court will enforce the 
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promise by ordering the promisor to pay damages, calculated in light 
of the benefit which the promisee reasonably expected to gain from 
performance (the "expectation interest"), the extent to which the 
promisee has suffered by virtue of reliance on the promise (the "reli-
ance interest"), or the amount of unjust enrichment which the prom-
isor would otherwise retain (the "restitution interest"). Ordinarily, 
damages awarded for nonperformance of a promise made in a com-
mercial setting will be based on the promisee's expectation interest, if 
that can be calculated with sufficient certainty and the test of foresee-
ability is met. See Comment h, below. Damages for nonperform-
ance of a promise made in a nonbusiness setting may in the court's 
discretion be limited to the plaintiff's reliance or restitution interests, 
as justice requires. 
g. Persons who may eeforce. The principle expressed is not lim-
ited to enforcement of the promise by the promisee. In some cases, 
the promisee may assign its right to performance to another person, 
in which case the latter will ordinarily have the right of enforcement. 
Or, substantial and foreseeable reliance by one other than the prom-
isee may make enforcement in favor of that person appropriate in 
order to prevent injustice. Unless the person seeking enforcement is 
the promisee, an assignee thereof, or some person apparently in-
tended by the parties to have a right to enforce that promise, en-
forcement will ordinarily be limited to damages calculated to 
compensate the claimant for substantial and foreseeable reliance on 
the promise. 
h. Foreseeability. In the area of promissory liability, as in the 
area of liability for tortious conduct, the law generally requires as a 
condition for enforcement that the defendant be shown to have had 
reason to foresee the injurious consequences of which the plaintiff 
complains; this is because ordinarily it is considered unjust to hold 
an actor liable for harm which he or she did not either actually fore-
see or at least have reason to foresee. This requirement, however, 
will be affected by other factors in the case. Thus, particularly where 
the promise is made in a commercial setting, certain types of harm so 
commonly result from nonperformance that the promisor will be 
held as a matter of law to have had reason to foresee them; others, 
less common, may be found as a matter of fact to have been reason-
ably foreseeable in all the circumstances. When a promise is made 
in a noncommercial setting, the court is likely to insist on a higher 
degree of foreseeability, particularly where the promise was not 
made as part of a bargained-for exchange, present or projected. 
i Injury. The principle stated above provides for the granting of 
a remedy only in cases where injury has occurred from the nonper-
formance of a promise. In cases where the injury is to the plaintiff's 
reliance or restitution interest, a remedy will ordinarily be awarded 
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if the other requirements of this principle are satisfied. Where the 
injury is to the plaintifrs expectation interest only, it is for the court 
to decide in all circumstances whether enforcement by protecting 
plaintifl's expectation of performance ( either by specific performance 
or by an award of damages) is appropriate in order to do justice 
between the parties. See Commentf, above. 
j Just!ftcation for nonpeiformance. In some cases, the promisor's 
statement of intention to perform will itself have been expressly con-
ditioned on the occurrence of some event; in others, it will be reason-
able for the court to imply such a condition. This condition may 
consist of some performance which the promisor had been promised 
in return, or may be some other event. Even if the court finds that 
there has been a failure to perform the promise, it may conclude that 
no enforcement is appropriate, because that failure to perform was 
justified. This may be because of some circumstance that the law 
regards as a sufficient excuse in such cases generally, such as imprac-
ticability of performance or frustration of purpose; it may be because 
the promise was the result of fraud or material misrepresentation, or 
undue influence exerted on the promisor; it may be because some 
change in circumstance has occurred ( or come to light) which the 
promisee should have realized would justify nonperformance by the 
promisor. Some changes in circumstances (for example, financial in-
ability to perform) which ordinarily do not excuse the duty of per-
formance in a business setting may constitute a sufficient excuse for 
nonperformance where the promise was made in a nonbusiness set-
ting, particularly where it appears to have been made for altruistic 
motives and/ or not to have generated any substantial reliance on the 
promisee's part. 
III 
Given ''world enough and time," a committee of drafters could 
produce a full-scale "restatement" by elaborating the principles set 
forth above. (It probably would not be called a "Restatement of 
Contracts," for obvious reasons - perhaps "Restatement of Promis-
sory Obligations" would do for a working title.) Suppose they did, 
and suppose the draft were promulgated by a body as prestigious as 
the American Law Institute, thereafter to be regarded as strongly 
persuasive authority by courts across the land. What real changes 
from the present state of the law would result? 
For one thing, the way law teachers organize and present legal 
principles in this area would be affected. Some concepts which now 
receive substantial attention - such as "consideration," to take the 
most obvious example - would be relegated to the status of histori-
cal footnotes. Like window decals on a tourist's auto, their function 
would be to remind us of where we've been, not to tell us where we 
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are now. Other concepts which we now regard as central - such as 
"contract," "offer'' and "acceptance" - would continue to be useful 
and important tools of analysis, but they would be neither as crucial 
nor as dominant as they now are in our discussions. However, the 
evolution of terms and concepts is hardly a startling or radical no-
tion; both Restatements of Contracts have included suggestions for 
the abandonment of terminology previously employed.14 
Far more important than the question of terminology is the ques-
tion of impact on court behavior. Would such a "Restatement of 
Promissory Obligations" actually "change the law," in the sense of 
changing the decisions which courts make in the cases brought 
before them? In the first place, the above elaboration suggests virtu-
ally no outcome that has not in fact already been reached by courts, 
operating under the rules as now articulated, in order to reach the 
apparently just result in a particular case. So if the rule-shift sug-
gested above were in fact to work a change in results overall, this 
would not be a radical change in the kinds of decision reached, but 
at most a shift in the "mix" of outcomes, with some types being rarer 
and others more common. 
Whether even this much change would actually occur is open to 
question; quite possibly it would not. As an example, consider the 
evolution - described with approval by Farnsworth - of the "pre-
existing duty" rule (pp. 271-93). That rule, developed as a logical 
corollary of the general doctrine of consideration, required the pro-
ponent of an asserted agreement made in modification of an already-
existing contract to demonstrate that the modification agreement it-
self was not "one-sided," but was supported by consideration on 
both sides.15 In addition to its consistency with the general consider-
ation principle, the rule was said to have the virtue of policing "ex-
torted" modifications. 16 
14. E.g., the decision of the drafters of the REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932) to avoid 
classifying promises as "dependent" or "independent," p. 579 n.15, and the Restatement 2d's 
avoidance of the terms "bilateral" and "unilateral contract," p. 110, "condition subsequent," p. 
543, and "donee" and "creditor beneficiary," p. 716. 
15. REsTATEMENT 2D §§ 75, 78. 
16. Farnsworth offers Alaska Packers' Assn. v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902), as a 
case where "particularly outrageous threats" were employed to coerce a contract modification. 
P. 278 n.10. In that case, the court declined to enforce defendant employer's promises of in-
creased compensation, made in response to the plaintiffs' refusal to perform their contract 
obligations to work on defendant's fishing boats. The plaintiffs had attempted unsuccessfully 
to convince the court that their actions were justified by the "rotten and unserviceable" condi-
tion of the defendant's nets. 117 F. at 101. Today, the workers' action in Alaska Packers' 
would probably be described as a "wildcat strike," and a court just might be a little less in-
clined to swallow whole the employer's argument that of course the nets provided were not 
"rotten and unserviceable" because the employer's profits were dependent on them; from the 
employer's point of view, the decision whether to repair or replace the nets, "rotten" or not, 
would probably have been made on a cost-benefit analysis comparing the cost of repair or 
replacement with the likely loss in fish netted during the season. 
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In time, however, the pre-existing duty rule fell into disfavor, and 
courts developed the knack of getting around it where it appeared 
that otherwise injustice would result. In some cases this was done by 
manipulation of the notion of consideration itself,17 and in others by 
development of a new exception to the rule, based on the occurrence 
of "unanticipated difficulties" making the revised agreement appear 
to be a fair one, after all. 18 In some cases courts were ingenuous ( or 
ingenious) enough to buy the notion that the parties to an existing 
contract could simultaneously rescind that contract and create a new 
one, which could then be held to satisfy the consideration require-
ment for enforcement.19 The drafters of the U.C.C. simply abolished 
any requirement of consideration for modification agreements under 
Article 2, while noting the possibility that enforcement of such an 
agreement might nevertheless be avoided on the ground that it was 
procured by the "bad faith" conduct of its proponent.20 
In light of widespread judicial dissatisfaction with the pre-ex-
isting duty rule, and the various ways of avoiding it in cases where it 
would work an injustice (plus the availability of the concept of du-
ress as a means of avoiding enforcement of "extorted" modifica-
tions21), it seems that the Article 2 drafters' shift in doctrine was not 
a global one after all, but merely a shift in the burden of proof, away 
from the proponent of the modification and toward the one who 
would avoid it. The pre-existing duty rule had already become, as 
we say, "a rule that can be understood only in light of its excep-
tions." But the same thing can be said of the consideration doctrine 
in general, given the Mack-truck-sized exception made for cases of 
unbargained-for reliance;22 the Parol Evidence Rule, given the long 
catalogue of reasons why extrinsic evidence will be admitted and 
considered for some purpose despite the existence of an apparently 
integrated writing (pp. 447-77); and the Statute of Frauds, given 
three hundred years of judicial whittling-down, capped by the recent 
tendency to hold that the Statute bends to substantial reliance on an 
17. See, e.g., Swartz v. Lieberman, 323 Mass. 109, 112, 80 N.E.2d 5, 6 (1948) (discussed by 
Farnsworth at p. 275 n.22). 
18. See, e.g., King v. Duluth, Missabe & N. Ry., 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. ll05 (1895) (dis-
cussed at p. 276 n.3). 
19. See, e.g., Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921) (dis-
cussed at p. 274 n.17). 
20. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) and co=ent 2 thereto. 
21. See, e.g., Austin Instrument Co. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124,272 N.E.2d 533 (1971) 
(discussed at p. 278 n.12). As Farnsworth points out, p. 278, the concept of duress is a better 
tool than the consideration requirement for policing coerced modifications, since it will sup-
port not only a refusal to perform, but an action for restitution where the extorting party has 
succeeded in coercing not only a promise of increased compensation but the performance of 
that promise as well. Presumably the same restitutionary result should be available in an ac-
tion for bad faith breach under the U.C.C. 
22. Pp. 89-98; see generally Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: 17ze Prol!feration 
of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52 (1981). 
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oral bargain.23 If a rule is indeed understandable only in light of its 
exceptions, then one should consider whether the exceptions together 
do not now make up "the rule," with the former rule being itself 
relegated to the status of an exception.24 When judges leave office, 
they are usually addressed as "Judge" for the rest of their days, a 
custom that does little if any harm and honors their past service. 
When a rule ceases to be a rule in fact, however, we deceive each 
other and our students if we continue to call it "the rule" when it is 
really only our recollection of one.25 
With that thought in mind, I would suggest that the above "Re-
statement" of the rules respecting promissory obligations might work 
only the following real changes: (a) ensuring that the court would 
not feel obliged to deny an uncounseled party the benefit of a "one-
sided" but non-coerced modification of a non-goods contract;26 (b) 
enabling the recipient of a non-goods "firm offer" to avoid the effect 
of a surprise retraction without the necessity of demonstrating actual 
acts of reliance;27 and (c) permitting the court to enforce a purely 
gratuitous promise even in the absence of substantial reliance 
thereon. Even on the latter point, the discussion of "enforceability" 
in the "Comment" indicates that the court should feel free to con-
tinue to restrict the gratuitous-promisee to protection of his or her 
reliance interest;28 in many cases that may appear to be all that jus-
tice requires. But the court would have discretion to enforce a prom-
isee's "expectation interest" in the performance of a purely 
gratuitous promise that had not been relied upon. Perhaps this is 
truly the only substantial change that the rules set forth above would 
necessarily produce. If so, is that change an undesirable one? 
Professor Famsworth's answer to this question appears to be 
"yes." Conceptually, Farnsworth approaches Contract Law from 
23. See chapter 6 ("The Requirement of a Writing: The Statute of Frauds"). 
24. Readers of Lewis Carroll's ''Through the Looking Glass" will recall the White Queen's 
version of a rule more honored in the exception: "[J]am to-morrow and jam yesterday - but 
never jam to-day." L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND 
THERE 52 (S.H. Goodacre ed. 1983). 
25. For an example of a court oscillating between two versions of a "general rule," see 
Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co., 147 Md. 588, 128 A. 280 (1925). 
Compare 147 Md. at 593, 128 A. at 281 ("It may be stated as a general rule that a contract 
cannot be enforced by or against a person who is not a party to it."), with 147 Md. at 598, 128 
A. at 283 ("[A] party to a contract may as a general rule assign all his beneficial rights •.•• "). 
26. Presumably a counseled party in this situation would have foreseen the consideration 
issue, and structured the modification agreement to meet that objection. 
27. q: REsTATEMENT 2D § 87(2), which requires reliance for this result. Comment e to 
that section suggests that such reliance must be "substantial as well as foreseeable," while at 
the same time conceding that the foregoing of alternatives is a likely form of reliance. Since, at 
minimum, the offeree in such a case is likely to rely to the extent of delaying acceptance and 
neglecting to seek out alternatives, it would appear that in most cases of surprise retraction 
there will indeed have been substantial reliance, but perhaps of too "intangible" a nature to be 
objectively proveable. 
28. This would appear to approximate the effect of RESTATEMENT 2D § 90. 
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the classical perspective of bargained-for e:onsideration (pp. 4, 41-
82) and mutuality of obligation.29 The utility of contract law for him 
appears to lie in its enforcement of exchange transactions (pp. 4-10), 
and while he seems generally to approve of the increased employ-
ment of notions of good faith and fairness in resolving disputes be-
tween commercial bargainers, 30 he seems little inclined in general to 
replace the notion of "contract" with that of "promise."31 Of course, 
he concedes the legitimacy of promissory estoppel as an alternative 
basis for liability, but, however well-established, promissory estoppel 
appears still to sit considerably below the salt at the feast of law that 
Farnsworth has spread. 32 
As further evidence of Farnsworth's likely disapproval of this 
proposed expansion of liability, consider t~e Case of the Gold 
Watch. Several times,33 Farnsworth asks us to consider the hypo-
thetical case of an employee whose employer promises to give him a 
gold watch. At first, the watch is said to be a Christmas present (p. 
46); later, it is called a reward for the excellence of past services (pp. 
50, 58, 86). At one point, the employer adds a requirement that the 
employee stop by the office to pick it up (p. 61). Never, however, 
does the employee acquire an enforceable right to performance of 
29. Despite the decision of Restatement 2d's drafters to play down the concept of "mutual-
ity of obligation" (§ 79 states that there is no such additional requirement for enforceability, 
provided the requirement of consideration is satisfied), Farnsworth brings mutuality of obliga-
tion onstage early and approvingly as a basic principle to be respected, pp. 106-08, and calls it 
back repeatedly in order to justify or question more particular rules, e.g., pp. 139 (offeree not 
bound where acceptance did not comply with terms of offer), 169 (mailbox rule), 210 (indefi-
nite agreements), 219 (requirement of prompt ratification by minor coming of age), 255 (mis-
representation), 267 (duress). 
30. Pp. 33-34, 526-27, 610-11. His enthusiasm for these notions is not, however, un-
bounded. Pp. 240-41. 
31. Although he introduces the notion of "promise" immediately, Farnsworth quickly 
makes it clear that a single promise is important for the same reason that one wheel of a 
bicycle is important; it is one of two vital parts of a larger machine - in this case, the machine 
we call "exchange." Pp. 8-10. At one point Farnsworth describes, with seeming approval, the 
common law's historic position of assuming that promises are generally not enforceable, unless 
some positive reason for enforcement is shown in a particular case, rather than assuming a 
general rule of enforceability, with exceptions of nonenforcement being made where appropri-
ate. Pp. 12-13. 
32. By the end of the second paragraph of chapter I, Farnsworth has declared that "if 
nothing has been given in exchange for the promise, it has no legal consequences; and if it has 
no legal consequences, there is no contract." P. 4. There is no accompanying citation to the 
later discussion of promissory estoppel at pages 89-98. "Promissory estoppel" is not even an 
independent heading in the index; it is shunted over to "Reliance," which of course includes 
not only references to applications of what we ordinarily think of as promissory estoppel, but 
to reliance in other contexts as well. This may be as good a place as any, incidentally, for me 
to mention the only error I detected in my perusal of Farnsworth's 900-odd pages, an error 
which Farnsworth himself later corrects: Professor Williston did not, as asserted on page 96, 
"assiduously avoid" using the term "promissory estoppel" in the first Restatement. As Farns-
worth later notes, p. 438 n.13, although not employed in § 90 itself, that term was indeed used 
in Comment/ to § 178, which approves application of promissory estoppel to overcome the 
Statute of Frauds where defendant has promised to execute a writing. 
33. Pp. 46-47, 50, 58, 61, 86. 
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the employer's promise. Repeatedly, arguments on the employee's 
part are set up only to be knocked down: there is no consideration 
for the promise (pp. 46-47); past services cannot be consideration for 
a present promise (p. 50); the employer has not been unjustly en-
riched (p. 58); "stopping by to pick it up" is not bargained-for con-
sideration (although it could have been34), but merely a condition to 
a gratuitous promise (p. 61); a recital of something said to be "con-
sideration" will not make it so (p. 86). Famsworth's determination 
to tum the Gold Watch Case into the paradigm of the unenforced 
gratuitous promise is admirable for its stubborn tenacity, but other-
wise puzzling, particularly if the question is turned around. Instead 
of asking why the promise should be enforced, suppose we ask: 
''Why not?" 
The hypothetical employee and employer are obviously parties to 
an ongoing contract of employment; even if "at will," it is neverthe-
less a contractual relationship until terminated. If we take the ap-
proach of the Uniform Commercial Code,35 the burden is on the one 
who would avoid a promise made in modification of an existing con-
tract to show why that promise should not be enforced. No reason 
appears why this promise to pay more for services already performed 
should be regarded as the product of "bad faith" on the part of the 
promisee. Therefore, if this were a sale of goods contract, the prom-
ise should be enforced. 
Even under the "new" common law of the Restatement (Second), 
the result could be the same. The employer's promise of a gold 
watch seems likely to be the result of "unanticipated circumstances" 
(i.e., the employer has had a more profitable year than he antici-
pated, thanks _at least in part to the good work of the employee, or 
the employee's services have turned out to be substantially more val-
uable than the employer had anticipated when the contract fixing the 
employee's salary was made).36 If the policy against extortion is now 
34. As an illustration of this point, he puts a different hypothetical: 
Compare this promise by a father to his daughter: "If you y.'ill meet me at Tiffany's next 
Monday at noon, I will buy you the emerald ring advertised in this week's New Yorker." 
If one supposes that the father and daughter are estranged and that the daughter had 
refused to see the father, it is possible to make a case for bargain. 
P. 62 n.7. This example does indeed make Farnsworth's doctrinal point; however, as a coun-
terpoint to his repeated assertions of non-liability on the part of the promising employer, the 
"meet at Tiffany's case" (it is so indexed) gives the unfortunate impression that the Fleur 
Forsytes of the world are more deserving of the law's solicitude than the Bob Cratchits. 
35. U.C.C. § 2-209(1). The Restatement 2d has an analogous rule, § 89, which preserves, 
however, the underlying requirement of consideration: 
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding 
(a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by 
the parties when the contract was made; or 
(b) to the extent provided by statute; or 
(c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material change of posi-
tion in reliance on the promise. 
36. This would presumably make it possible to invoke RESTATEMENT 2D § 89, quoted in 
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effectuated by the common law rule against duress, that rule would 
hardly appear to be offended by enforcement of this freely-given 
promise of a "bonus" for work well done. Only the doctrine of con-
sideration in its unalloyed form appears to stand between the em-
ployee and his gold watch.37 Is preservation of this doctrine worth 
the nonenforcement of that promise? 
I would answer that it is not. My reasons for doing so relate not 
only to the hypothetical Gold Watch Case, but to the desirability of 
articulating principles of promissory liability in the general way sug-
gested above. They have to do with the effect that such changes 
might have on the overall perspective of (a) those who decide cases, 
(b) those who counsel clients with respect to the law in these matters, 
and (c) all the rest of us - students, teachers or just plain citizens. 
IV 
Commentators on Contract Law sometimes suggest that in this 
area it is particularly desirable for the rules of law to be predictable 
in their effect, because those rules will be used as a basis for transac-
tion-planning. It is also not uncommon, however, for both courts 
and commentators to observe, somewhat inconsistently, that in this 
area no case is necessarily a sure guide to the decision of any other, 
since every case must tum on its own facts.38 Farnsworth himself 
repeatedly suggests that whether a given rule will apply in a particu-
lar case must depend on "all the circumstances" of that case. 39 In 
the case of the Gold Watch, one of those circumstances is the exis-
tence of an employment relationship between the promisor and 
promisee. In deciding whether that promise should be enforced, 
what is the importance of that circumstance? 
First, it provides a motivation for the making of the promise. 
(Employers often have reason to feel grateful to their employees for 
past service well performed; they also often wish to spur their em-
note 35 supra, provided the employer's promise were made no later than one minute to five on 
the last business day of the employee's term of employment. Illustration 3 of§ 89 upholds an 
agreement raising an employee's rate of pay for the future, despite the existence of a binding 
contract calling for a lower rate; the only circumstance "not anticipated" is the fact that the 
employee has received a better offer from another employer. 
37. See pp. 47-48. Farnsworth's tenacity in holding fast to the requirement of considera-
tion is the more remarkable in light of the fact that he has earlier defended it with something 
of the enthusiasm displayed by Dr. Johnson for the dancing dog: 
[I]n view of the difficulty that other societies have had in developing a general basis for 
enforcing promises, it is perhaps less remarkable that the basis developed by the common 
law is logically flawed than that the common law succeeded in developing any basis at all. 
P. 20. 
38. For illustrative expressions of these two views, see Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor 
Coupling Co., 16 ill. 2d 234,242,254, 156 N.E.2d 513,517 (1958) (opinions ofKlingbiel, J., for 
the court, and Bristow, J., dissenting). 
39. E.g., pp. 125, 266-67, 457. 
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ployees to greater efforts in the future by behaving in a generous 
fashion.) Second, by the same token it provides a reason why the 
employee can reasonably believe the promise to have been seriously 
intended. Third, it means that any foreseeable reliance on the prom-
ise is likely to deserve compensation, in light of the employee's rea-
sonable belief that the promise will be kept. (For example, if the 
employee had responded to the promise by saying, "Great, now I 
can give my old watch away to the Salvation Army," and - having 
received no retraction or cautionary word from the employer - pro-
ceeded to do just that, would those facts not trigger promissory es-
toppel?) Finally - and this, I fear, may entail a leap of faith - it 
provides a reason why it is just that the promise be enforced. If in-
stead of the promise of a gold watch (since promises of a gold watch 
on retirement tend in fact to get performed, at the "retirement din-
ner"), one hypothesizes the promise of a pension or other benefits 
after retirement, then that strikes this observer as a promise which, in 
all the circumstances, ought to be kept, and ought to be enforceable 
if not kept - in part because reliance of all kinds (tangible and in-
tangible) is likely in the long run, and in part simply because justice 
demands it.40 If the court agrees, I believe it should have sufficient 
discretion under the rules of law to so decide. 
In light of what has just been said it might seem that the reorder-
ing of rules suggested above would, in the end, come down to little 
more than telling courts that they should, in the light of all the cir-
cumstances, do justice in the particular case.41 However, since the 
proportion of claims and disputes which actually go to litigation is 
only a minuscule fraction of the total, "the law" in this area is not 
simply what the courts say it is: it is rather the way that people be-
40. Although Farnsworth states that the rule denying enforcement of a promise made for 
"past consideration" has been most important in cases where pensions were promised, p. 50, he 
elsewhere notes that such promises are likely to be enforceable on the basis of reliance. Pp. 89, 
94 n.30. Such reliance could consist of retiring from work if that were optional, in which case 
Restatement § 90 would apply (as in Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1959) (discussed at p. 89 n.2)); or it could consist of continuing to work (in which case not only 
might § 90 apply, but the consideration test might also be satisfied). If a pension were prom-
ised to an employee after all her services had been performed, and her decision to retire had 
already been made (or, perhaps, she had arrived at an age of mandatory retirement), then 
Farnsworth would apparently allow the promise to go unenforced, because it was neither bar-
gained for nor relied on. P. 94. It is possible, of course, that after retirement the employee 
would rely on the promise, particularly if it were being performed, in various ways such as not 
taking another job or spending money she would otherwise save; whether Farnsworth would 
regard these types of reliance-by-forbearance as sufficient to justify enforcement is unclear. P. 
94 n.31. Before the promise is relied on, even by forebearance, should it be enforced? Al-
though Farnsworth would apparently answer no, he elsewhere cites with no indication of dis-
approval or doubt case law enforcing against an employee a covenant not to compete, made at 
the end of the employee's service for the promisee (and thus at a time when both consideration 
for and reliance on the promise would be difficult to show). P. 339 n.20. If it is just to hold an 
employee to a promise made at that point, it seems no less just to hold an employer to a 
promise then made. 
41. Of course, the same could be said about the present rule of RESTATEMENT 2D § 90. 
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have in light of their own or their attorneys' predictions of how a 
court might decide the dispute between them, should it be asked to 
do so. Abolition or at least de-emphasis of the "technical defenses" 
would force anyone seeking to avoid liability to concentrate on the 
substantive aspects of the case: Was the promise in fact made? Is its 
nonperformance legally excusable for some reason? The parties' 
own attempt to resolve their dispute would then be more likely to 
center on the merits of those substantive issues, rather than on un-
productive "stone-walling" behind the barrier of a technical defense. 
Furthermore, if every contract imposes on all parties a duty to act in 
"good faith" (and thus on merchants the duty to act in accordance 
with reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing), it will be-
hoove each party to any commercial dispute to behave so as to maxi-
mize the chance that a court would later find that he or she acted 
"fairly" in the circumstances.42 If, long before the courtroom door is 
in sight, the attorneys on both sides are counseling their clients to 
behave so as to give at least the appearance of fairness, there is sub-
stantial chance that this appearance will be more than skin deep. 
The upshot of all this is not increased likelihood that the parties will 
manage to settle their dispute - that would be likely in any event, 
because of the substantial cost of litigation - but that their settle-
ment will be reached on terms which a disinterested and fair-minded 
arbitrator might have imposed. 
My final point is directed not only at judges or lawyers, but at all 
those Gudges and lawyers included) who are teachers or students ( or 
both) of the law. One comes away from Farnsworth's account with 
the distinct feeling that there is a deep and unresolved conflict at the 
heart of what we call "Contract Law," a conflict visible in the variety 
of views advanced, particularly in recent years, by the Contracts 
"theorists." At its most fundamental level, this can be described as 
the divergence between those who see the decision to enforce prom-
issory obligations as primarily an expression of moral values, and 
those who see it as promoting market effi.ciency.43 One might, of 
42. As an example of "fairness" paying off in court, see Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 
153 P.2d 47 (1944) (lessor offered to lower the rent and waive the restriction against subleasing; 
Jessee held to lease despite claim of frustration of purpose). (Farnsworth discusses this case at 
page 693.) Another result of limiting the effect of the technical defenses could be a lessening of 
the dilemma an attorney may face between counseling a course of conduct which is "ethical" 
(and thus either "morally right" or at least "good business") and advising a client of the full 
limit of his or her "rights" under all the available legal rules. See, e.g., Stevens, Ethics and the 
Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355 (1952); Yonge, The Unheralded Demise of the Statute 
of Frauds Welsher in Oral Contracts for the Sale of Goods and Investment Securities, 33 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. l (1976). 
43. It is obviously possible to take the position that "morality" is also "efficient," or that 
"efficiency" is also "moral" (or, perhaps, both?), so the characterization of particular commen-
tators according to the dichotomy suggested in the text is, at best, arguable. With that caveat, 
it is possible to identify certain writers as concerned primarily with questions of efficiency, 
others with those of morality. In the former camp, in addition to the obvious choice of Prof es-
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course, conclude that (a) either point of view is in any case only a 
rationalization for the system we have, rather than an explanation of 
why we have it,44 or that (b) whether one holds one point of view or 
the other is really of little importance, since most case outcomes can 
be defended and/or attacked by persons holding either view.45 Both 
of these observations have more than a grain of truth in them. 
Therefore, does a choice at the theoretical level really matter? 
Ultimately it does, if only as a symbolic expression of the values 
of the society which has created, and is served by, "the law." When 
discussing the rules of the "tort" law system, we constantly propound 
and seriously discuss hypothetical cases in which tortious acts of var-
ious kinds - assault, battery, slander, etc. - are committed under 
circumstances which obviously would generate damage claims so 
trivial in amount that they would never be litigated. This does not 
deter us, however, from seriously characterizing such conduct, at 
least in theory, as "tortious." Why should the same not be true with 
promises? Instead of dwelling on only the reciprocal aspect of many 
ordinary contracts of exchange, why not focus on the broader under-
lying principle that whenever a promise is made which generates in 
the promisee a reasonable expectation of performance, its unjustified 
sor (now Judge) Richard A. Posner, one might include Professors John H. Barton, Robert 
Birmingham, Charles J. Goetz, Anthony T. Kronman, and Robert E. Scott. See, e.g., R. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Barton, The Economic Basis of JJamages for 
Breach of Contract, l J. LEGAL Sruo. 277 (1972); Birmingham, .Breach of Contract, JJamage 
Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); Goetz & Scott, The Mill• 
gation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 
(1983); Kronman, Mistake, JJisclosure, Ieformation, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. I (1978). Among the moralists, one could perhaps list Charles Fried, Peter Linzer, and 
Patricia H. Marschall. See, e.g., C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Linzer, On the 
Amorality of Contract Remedies - Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 CoLUM, 
L. REV. 111 (1981); Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies/or Breach 
of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 733 (1982). As "moralists" on a different level - certainly 
concerned with values other than "efficiency,'' at least as the "efficiency school" would define it 
- one might also refer to those identified with the "Critical Legal Studies" group who write in 
the Contract area, such as Professors Jay M. Feinman, Duncan Kennedy, and Karl E. Klare. 
See, e.g., Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983); Ken-
nedy, JJislributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tori Law, with Special Reference to 
Compulsory Tenns and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. REV. 563 (1982); Klare, Book 
Review, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876 (1979) (reviewing C. KNAPP, supra note 12). 
44. See, e.g., Holahan & Sussna, Book Review, 28 J. LEGAL Eouc. 234, 234 (1976) (re• 
viewing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972)). 
45. Thus, writers using efficiency-analysis tools will not necessarily arrive at the same con-
clusions. Compare Goetz & Scott, Liquidated JJamages, Penalties and the Just Compensation 
Principle: Some Notes on an Eeforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 554 (1977) (judicial hostility to agreed remedies anachronistic and inefficient), with 
Note, Liquidated JJamages and Penalties Under the Un!form Commercial Code and the Common 
Law: An Economic Analysis of Contract JJamages, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055 (1978) (traditional 
rule regulating liquidated damages economically justifiable). On the other hand, pursuit of the 
goals of efficiency and morality may sometimes lead to the same outcome. Compare Linzer, 
Sllpra note 43 (specific performance should be routinely available, in interests of morality and 
fairness), with Schwartz, The Case/or Spec!ftc Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (greater 
availability of specific performance would be more efficient). 
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nonperformance should in theory be an actionable wrong? A prom-
ise that does indeed generate a reasonable expectation of perform-
ance is likely to do so for one ( or perhaps both) of the following two 
reasons: either the promisor in making the promise was actuated in 
part by reasons of self-interest, known to the promisee, which make 
performance of the promise for that reason likely to occur; or the 
promisor stands in such a relation to the promisee as to make it rea-
sonable to believe that the promise was actuated by altruistic con-
cern for the promisee's welfare, which concern is likely to generate 
performance for the same reason that it generated the promise. To 
state this principle as a base-line is not to overlook the possibility 
that in a particular case the reason for nonperformance will be re-
garded as a legal excuse. Indeed, the more "gratuitous" the promise, 
the more likely it may be that various changes in circumstances will 
be so regarded. But this principle would emphasize the fact that 
promise-keeping in general is not merely praiseworthy behavior, but 
an absolutely necessary glue for'holding society together,46 and that 
promise-breaking - whether "efficient" or not47 - is a socially un-
desirable activity, destructive of the social fabric, and productive of 
all types of harm, both measurable and immeasurable.48 
Like the first and second of Dickens' visiting spirits, Professor 
Farnsworth has spread before the eyes of his readers a panorama of 
what Contract Law was and of what it has become: Contract Past 
46. A number of commentators have attempted in recent years to focus our attention on 
the interrelation (or, sometimes, the lack thereof) between law and behavior, particularly the 
behavior of businesspersons in a commercial setting. At the head of anyone's list in this area 
would be Professors Ian R. Macneil and Stewart Macaulay, whose contributions Farnsworth 
singles out for brief mention when discussing the agreement process. Pp. 110-13. 
47. Farnsworth generally spends little time in discussion of "Contract Theory," but he 
does at least occasionally cite and briefly discuss the views of writers such as Richard Posner 
(see, e.g., p. 316 n.51). He does, in addition, devote three pages of his chapter on Remedies to 
a brief introduction to the economic analysis oflaw. In the course of that discussion, he sum-
marizes the notion generally referred to as "efficient breach,'' see Birmingham, supra note 43; 
Goetz & Scott, supra note 45, although he does not himself employ the term. P. 817. While 
noting that economic analysis is "not without shortcomings,'' Farnsworth concludes that it 
does indeed "support ... traditional contract doctrine in this area." P. 818. He does not cite, 
probably because it appeared too late for mention, Professor Ian Macneil's recent answer to 
the "efficient breach" theorists. Macneil, Efficient JJreach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 , 
VA. L. RE.v. 947 (1982). A citation to Macneil's article should, in my opinion, be appended to 
future discussions of the doctrine of efficient breach, as routinely (and for roughly the same 
reason) as the Surgeon General's warning is appended to a pack of cigarettes. 
48. To restate Contract Law as suggested in Part II, supra, would obviously heighten its 
resemblance to Tort Law. This possibility has been recognized by others, particularly where 
liability based on promissory estoppel is concerned. See pp. 96 n.38, 98 n.47 (Famsworth's 
reference to such suggestions by Professors Seavey and Posner). The possibility that Contract 
Law as a whole is becoming "con-torted" was put forth by Professor Grant Gilmore in his 
famous THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 90 (1974); in his view, however, Contract Law's evolution 
into something resembling Tort Law lay in the increasing tendency of the former to impose 
"implied" obligations, not bottomed on consent. In commenting on Gilmore's thesis, Profes-
sor Richard Speidel has rightly stressed the continued primacy of consent. Speidel, An Essay 
on the Reported JJeath and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. RE.v. 1161 (1975). 
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and Contract Present. While providing a number of tantalizing 
glimpses, he has on the whole left it to us to provide a vision of 
Contract Future. Of that future, perhaps only two things can be said 
with any assurance: it will arrive in due course, whether we wish it 
or not; when it does, it will be our creation. 
